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Legally Speaking — Google Books: It Ain’t Over ’til the
Librarian Sings
by William M. Hannay1 (Partner, Schiff Hardin LLP, Chicago, IL) <whannay@schiffhardin.com>

O

n October 16, 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit handed down its opinion dismissing the Authors
Guild’s copyright case against Google Inc.2 What does it all
mean for librarians?

History of the Google Books case

Let’s make a quick trip through the history of this long-running
litigation. It all began in 2004 when Google announced the initiation
of its “Google Print” project and its “Library Project” (now generally
called “Google Books”). A few months later in 2005, the Authors
Guild, several individual authors, and various publishers filed a lawsuit
in New York City against Google, seeking to enjoin the project from
going forward.
As litigation sometimes does, the proceedings began to drag out as the
parties filed various motions with the court and engaged in preliminary
investigations (known as “discovery”). The parties also began negotiations over a possible settlement in 2006. After extended discussions,
the parties filed a proposed settlement agreement on October 28, 2008.
Notice of the proposed settlement was widely circulated and produced
hundreds of objections. The parties then modified the proposal and, on
November 13, 2009, filed a proposed Amended Settlement Agreement
with the trial court.
After notice of the amended settlement was circulated in early 2010,
another flood of objections was filed, including one from the U.S. Department of Justice which alleged that, if the proposed settlement was
adopted, substantial anticompetitive effects would result. On March
22, 2011, U.S. District Judge Chin rejected the amended settlement as
not “fair, adequate, and reasonable.”
The parties went back to the drawing board but were unable to
reach a settlement that was likely to pass muster with the court. So
the case resumed its litigation posture, and on May 31, 2012, Judge
Chin certified a class of plaintiff-authors and allowed them to proceed
to trial.3 But a little over a year later, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit vacated the class certification and ordered Judge Chin
to consider whether or not Google had a legitimate “fair use” defense.
He did so, and on November 14, 2013, Judge Chin granted summary
judgment to Google on its fair use defense.
The Authors Guild filed an appeal which, almost two years later in
October 2015, resulted in affirmance of the District Court’s judgment.

Where Are We Now that the Case is Over?

Is it actually over? Plaintiffs could possibly file a petition for a writ
of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court, but the likelihood of the Court
accepting the case for review — and actually reversing it — seems low.
But the truth of the matter is that, assuming the case is over, the
legal result of the case is both extremely sweeping and at the same time
extremely narrow. While millions of individual books have been copied
and made part of the Google Books project, all that the Second Circuit
has approved are the narrow word search and “snippet” features of the
project. The court’s opinion is limited to this specific conduct, and
there is no court authorization for Google to do anything more than that.
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On a book-by-book basis, therefore, very little of the works are
actually made available to users of the system.

A Reminder of what Google is doing

Google has made digital copies of millions of books that were
submitted to it for that purpose by major libraries. Over 20 million
have been scanned since 2004 (at an average cost of $10 per book). In
turn, Google has established a publicly-available search function for
the digital copies.
Specifically, an Internet user can use this function to search — without charge or advertising — to determine whether the book contains a
specified word or term. The result of the search is that the user can see
“snippets” of text containing the searched-for terms.
In addition, participating libraries (i.e., those that have made their
books available to Google for scanning) are given a limited right to
download and retain digital copies of the books that they submitted.

Google’s Search Function is Quite Limited

The search function in Google Books is quite limited. Only the first
usage of the searched-for term on a given page is displayed, for example.
Overall for each book containing the search term, a maximum of three
“snippets” containing the term are displayed. (A snippet is a horizontal
segment comprising ordinarily an eighth of a page highlighting the term.)
It appears that the Google Books system cannot be fooled into providing more quotations. In particular, a researcher cannot increase the
number of snippets revealed on the system simply by repeating the entry
of the same search term or by entering searches from different computers.
Moreover, one snippet per page and one page out of ten containing
the term are randomly “blacklisted” by Google and cannot be displayed.
Further, no snippet views of certain books such as dictionaries, cookbooks, and short poems are permitted.

The Second Circuit’s Ruling

In analyzing “fair use,” the Court of Appeals applied the four-part
statutory test contained in Section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976.
That Act provides that in determining whether a use is “fair,” the factors
to be considered must include:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value
of the copyrighted work.
Focusing heavily on the first factor (i.e., the purpose and character
of the use), the Court of Appeals upheld Google’s making of a digital
copy to provide a search function as fair use because it is “transformative.” It augments public knowledge by making available information
about authors’ books. By contrast, Google does not provide the public
continued on page 50
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with a substantial “substitute” for the substance of the matter protected
by the authors’ copyrights in the original works. The same is true, at
least under present conditions, of Google’s provision of the “snippet”
function. The search tool permits a researcher to identify those books,
out of millions, that do – as well as those that do not — use the terms
selected by the researcher.
While Google is a for-profit entity, the court held that profit motivation
does not in these circumstances justify denial of fair use. In any event,
Google does not charge for the search and snippet functions. (Whether
a court might view matters differently if Google were to attempt to monetize these services by charging for them is a question for another day.)

Legal Precedent: Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music

The Second Circuit devoted considerable attention to interpreting the
Supreme Court’s 1994 decision on fair use in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music.4 There, a music group called “2 Live Crew” recorded a parody
of Roy Orbison’s 1964 hit “Pretty Woman” without obtaining a license.
The rights holder had sued and lost before the District Court, but won
a reversal before the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The appellate court held that the commercial nature of the parody rendered it
presumptively unfair under Section 107. The Supreme Court disagreed,
however, and reinstated the trial court’s dismissal of the claim. The Court
held that a commercial parody may be fair use if it is “transformative.”

A Caveat Re: “Transformative”

Following the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Campbell, the Second
Circuit held that Google’s use of the copied books was transformative.
However, the court issued a strong caveat narrowing the reach of that
defense. Speaking for the court, Judge Pierre Leval (who is considered
something of an expert on copyright law) stated:
“The word ‘transformative’ cannot be taken too literally as a
sufficient key to understanding the elements of fair use. It is
rather a suggestive symbol for a complex thought, and does not
mean that any and all changes made to an author’s original text
will necessarily support a finding of fair use.”

Derivative Works and “Transformations”

Last year, the Second Circuit had given narrow approval to libraries’
pooling of the digital copies of their books provided to them by Google
after scanning. Some 80 universities and libraries had submitted over
ten million digitized books into the HathiTrust repository which permits
patrons to search for files for particular terms (but does not provide
snippets). Patrons with print disabilities (such as blindness) are provided
full-text access to the books.
In its 2014 HathiTrust decision,5 the Second Circuit distinguished
between “derivative works” (which are not entitled to a “fair use” defense) and transformative works (which may be). The court said that
“[p]aradigmatic examples of derivative works include the translation
of a novel into another language, the adaptation of a novel into a movie
or play, or the recasting of a novel as an eBook or an audiobook.” In
Google Books, the court explained that, “[w]hile such changes can be
described as transformations, they do not involve the kind of transformative purpose that favors a fair use finding.”

The Key to Google Books is the Limited
Nature of Google’s Use

The court perceived that the specialized use by Google of the
copyrighted work distinguished it from unfair and improper uses. By
asking solely whether the work contains a word of interest, Google’s
search function in effect treats the book as a mere compilation of data
rather than exploiting its expressive content. The following quotes from
HathiTrust and Google Books illustrate this perspective:
“[T]he result of a word search is different in purpose, character,
expression, meaning, and message from the page (and the book)
from which it is drawn.” — HathiTrust
“[T]he purpose of Google’s copying of the original copyrighted
books is to make available significant information about those
books.” — Google Books
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This transformation is made greater by the “snippet” function, in the
court’s view. “Snippet view adds important value to the basic transformative search function.”
“Merely knowing that a term of interest appears in a book does not
necessarily tell the searcher whether she needs to obtain the book,
because it does not reveal whether the term is discussed in a manner or context falling within the scope of the searcher’s interest.”

For Transformation, Google Needed to Copy the Whole Book

In order to achieve these transformative search functions, Google
needed to copy the whole book. But importantly, though Google in
effect makes an unauthorized digital copy of the entire book, it does not
reveal that digital copy to the public. The amount and substantiality of
what is made accessible to a public is very limited.
Google has constructed the snippet feature in a manner that substantially protects against its serving as a substitute for authors’ books.
In the court’s words:
“Google safeguards from public view the digitized copies it
makes and allows access only to the extent of permitting the public to search for the very limited information accessible through
the search function and snippet view. The program does not allow
access in any substantial way to a book’s expressive content.”

Recall that Google Tried to Get a Lot More than This.

The actual use made of the copyrighted works is far narrower than
Google envisioned a decade ago. Consider the failed 2009 amended
settlement: it would have allowed Google to make substantially more
extensive use of its scans of copyrighted books than the current arrangement. There, Google sought the right to:
(1) sell subscriptions to an electronic books database;
(2) sell online access to individual books; and
(3) sell advertising on pages from books.
The amended settlement (if it had been approved) would have
effectively granted Google a monopoly over digital books, and, in
particular, orphan books.
But none of these uses exist in the current arrangement.

Libraries’ Use of Their Digitized Books is as
Restricted as Google

Reading HathiTrust and Google Books together, it is clear that the
participating libraries must use their digital copies to enable only the
kinds of searches that the Second Circuit has held to be fair uses in
connection with Google’s offer of such searches to the Internet public:
i.e., word searches and snippets.
Libraries may not freely disseminate or allow patrons to access the
full-text of digital copies and defend by claiming “fair use.” (Only the
narrow category of print-disabled patrons may have access to the full
text of the digitized books.)

Can Libraries Be Liable for Copyright Infringement?

With respect to the digital copies that Google has created (and returned to them), if libraries were to misuse them in an infringing manner,
those libraries may be liable to authors for copyright infringement.
Also, libraries might incur liability by negligent mishandling of,
and failure to protect, their digital copies, leaving them unreasonably
vulnerable to hacking.

A Musical Aside

All this suggests to me a Rodgers & Hart song from their 1940
musical Pal Joey (which I have “transformed” for fair use purposes):
If they asked me, I could scan a book,
That you could read upon a Kindle or Nook.
You could search the preface inside and out
So you’d know what data’s about.
And the simple secret of the plot
Is just to limit what we disclose a lot.
Then the world discovers as our case ends
On what our fair use law depends.
continued on page 51
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Now it’s Your Turn to Talk …

It is important to hear from librarians about Google Books, because in the end, the essential question to be answered is whether the
Google Books project has been worth all the effort to create it (and to
fight about it). So, I would like to know what you have to say on the
following questions:
Is Google Books being used by libraries and library patrons in a
productive (and proper way)?
Is the world (at least the library world) a better place for its creation?
Share your answers with the author at <whannay@schiffhardin.
com>.

Endnotes
1. Mr. Hannay is a partner in the Chicago-based law firm Schiff Hardin
LLP and an Adjunct Professor at IIT/Chicago-Kent law school. He
is a regular speaker at the Charleston Conference and a contributor to
Against the Grain.
2. Authors Guild et al. v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015).
3. On October 4, 2012, the Association of American Publishers and
Google announced that they had settled the publishers’ part of the Google
Books litigation. See http://www.publishers.org/press85/. The settlement
provides access to publishers’ in-copyright books and journals digitized
by Google for its Google Library Project. Other terms — including
monetary payments, if any — were not disclosed.
4. 510 U.S. 569, 114 S. Ct. 1164, 127 L. Ed. 2d 500 (1994).
5. Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 95 (2d Cir. 2014).

Cases of Note — Register Your Copyright Without
Delay
Column Editor: Bruce Strauch (The Citadel) <strauchb@citadel.edu>
LA RESOLANA ARCHITECTS, PA.
V. CLAY REALTORS ANGEL FIRE AND
ANGEL FIRE HOME DESIGN. UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
TENTH CIRCUIT. 416 F.3d 1195; 2005 U.S.
App. LEXIS 15319.
This is about that oddity of the author
having copyright when the work is fixed in a
tangible medium but having to register before
suit can be brought.
La Resolana Architects met with Clay
Realtors to discuss building townhouses at
the famous Angel Fire, New Mexico ski resort.
Architectural drawings were shown that were
done specifically for the site, but no agreement
was reached. This was in 1996-97.
In 2003, an architect from La Resolana
was at the site and noticed a very similar set
of townhouses being sold by Clay. Teeing up
for a lawsuit, La Res applied to register their
copyright, sent in apps, fees, etc. Before confirmation of the registration, La Res filed suit.
Clay moved for dismissal because La Res
lacked a certificate of copyright registration.
La Res replied all the stuff had been received,
and copyright was approved for registration
on Jan. 22, 2004.
Why do lawyers do these kind of delaying
things? Do they imagine the other side will
get bored and go away?
The district court held for Clay. And up
we go to the Tenth Circuit.

So which is it?

Subject matter jurisdiction gives a court
power to adjudicate a case. The 1976 Copyright Act merged a confusing mix of state and
federal law into a single and exclusive Federal
system. All state law was preempted.
Protection was made easier by granting it
the moment an original idea “leaves the mind”
and is put into a tangible medium. See 17
U.S.C. § 102(a) (“Copyright protection subsists
… in original works of authorship fixed in a
tangible medium”).

Registration

Registration is simple. Provide a copy
of the work, an application and a fee. The
Register of Copyrights then checks the work
to determine if it is copyrightable. If it is, then
“the Register shall register the claim and issue
to the applicant a certificate of registration.” 17
U.S.C. § 410(a).
But the protection is always there from that
moment of tangible medium. “[R]egistration
is not a condition of copyright infringement.”
17 U.S.C. § 408(a). In fact, registering is
entirely voluntary.

But if you want to sue …?

The big benefit of registering is you are
allowed to sue in federal court for infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a). And the certificate
of registration serves as prima facie evidence
of the copyright’s validity.

Now, about our case …

“[N]o action for infringement of the copyright … shall be instituted until preregistration
or registration of the copyright claim has been
made in accordance with this title.”
And even if the registration has been
refused, you may still sue with a copy of the
complaint served on the Register of Copyrights. Id. 411(a).
The word “preregistration” was added in
2005. But this was not part of the
statute when this action was filed.
Nothing in the language
even suggests that receipt
by the Copyright Office
is sufficient. Registration
is not automatic. It can be
refused. You must have
registration or refusal before filing suit. And
you’re trying to establish your prima facie
case for copyright.

But despite the plain language …

Gosh darn it, the courts are divided between the “Registration approach” and the
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“Application approach.” The Registration
approach can be found in Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc. v. Benrus
Watch Co., 260 F.2d 637, 640-41 (2d Cir.
1958). And there’s the nice “the examination would be meaningless if filing and
registration were synonymous.” Robinson
v. Princeton Review, Inc., 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16932.
But Mel Nimmer and various courts think
application is sufficient. After all, the owner
can sue whether the application is rejected or
not. See Melville B. Nimmer, Nimmer on
Copyright, Vol. 2 § 7.16[B][1][a], p. 7-154-56.
See also, Lakedreams v. Taylor, 932 F.2d 1103,
1108 (5th Cir. 1991).
They note that an infringer can run amok
while the Copyright Office sifts through piles
of applications. The owner can sue and move
towards a court date while waiting for the
certificate.

And yet …

Do you really need a paper certificate to
sue? The fact of registration can exist before
the certificate goes out. And it’s the fact of
registration that gives the court jurisdiction.

Nonetheless …

The Tenth Circuit sticks with the registration requirement. The creative soul ought
to get busy and register without waiting
for someone to infringe.
Plus you could
have the odd
circumstance
of presumption
of validity upon
application,
then have the
certificate refused, and the presumption flips
back.
And they affirm the dismissal of the complaint.
And the billable hours go up for lawyers.
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